CalAnonSync/src/calanonsync/vendor/github.com/ThomsonReutersEikon/go-ntlm/ntlm/ntlmv1.go

393 lines
12 KiB
Go

//Copyright 2013 Thomson Reuters Global Resources. BSD License please see License file for more information
package ntlm
import (
"bytes"
rc4P "crypto/rc4"
"errors"
"log"
"strings"
)
/*******************************
Shared Session Data and Methods
*******************************/
type V1Session struct {
SessionData
}
func (n *V1Session) SetUserInfo(username string, password string, domain string) {
n.user = username
n.password = password
n.userDomain = domain
}
func (n *V1Session) GetUserInfo() (string, string, string) {
return n.user, n.password, n.userDomain
}
func (n *V1Session) SetMode(mode Mode) {
n.mode = mode
}
func (n *V1Session) Version() int {
return 1
}
func (n *V1Session) fetchResponseKeys() (err error) {
n.responseKeyLM, err = lmowfv1(n.password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
n.responseKeyNT = ntowfv1(n.password)
return
}
func (n *V1Session) computeExpectedResponses() (err error) {
if NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY.IsSet(n.NegotiateFlags) {
n.ntChallengeResponse, err = desL(n.responseKeyNT, md5(concat(n.serverChallenge, n.clientChallenge))[0:8])
if err != nil {
return err
}
n.lmChallengeResponse = concat(n.clientChallenge, make([]byte, 16))
} else {
n.ntChallengeResponse, err = desL(n.responseKeyNT, n.serverChallenge)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// NoLMResponseNTLMv1: A Boolean setting that controls using the NTLM response for the LM
// response to the server challenge when NTLMv1 authentication is used.<30>
// <30> Section 3.1.1.1: The default value of this state variable is TRUE. Windows NT Server 4.0 SP3
// does not support providing NTLM instead of LM responses.
noLmResponseNtlmV1 := false
if noLmResponseNtlmV1 {
n.lmChallengeResponse = n.ntChallengeResponse
} else {
n.lmChallengeResponse, err = desL(n.responseKeyLM, n.serverChallenge)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
func (n *V1Session) computeSessionBaseKey() (err error) {
n.sessionBaseKey = md4(n.responseKeyNT)
return
}
func (n *V1Session) computeKeyExchangeKey() (err error) {
if NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY.IsSet(n.NegotiateFlags) {
n.keyExchangeKey = hmacMd5(n.sessionBaseKey, concat(n.serverChallenge, n.lmChallengeResponse[0:8]))
} else {
n.keyExchangeKey, err = kxKey(n.NegotiateFlags, n.sessionBaseKey, n.lmChallengeResponse, n.serverChallenge, n.responseKeyLM)
}
return
}
func (n *V1Session) calculateKeys(ntlmRevisionCurrent uint8) (err error) {
// This lovely piece of code comes courtesy of an the excellent Open Document support system from MSFT
// In order to calculate the keys correctly when the client has set the NTLMRevisionCurrent to 0xF (15)
// We must treat the flags as if NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY is set.
// This information is not contained (at least currently, until they correct it) in the MS-NLMP document
if ntlmRevisionCurrent == 15 {
n.NegotiateFlags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY.Set(n.NegotiateFlags)
}
n.ClientSigningKey = signKey(n.NegotiateFlags, n.exportedSessionKey, "Client")
n.ServerSigningKey = signKey(n.NegotiateFlags, n.exportedSessionKey, "Server")
n.ClientSealingKey = sealKey(n.NegotiateFlags, n.exportedSessionKey, "Client")
n.ServerSealingKey = sealKey(n.NegotiateFlags, n.exportedSessionKey, "Server")
return
}
func (n *V1Session) Seal(message []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (n *V1Session) Sign(message []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func ntlmV1Mac(message []byte, sequenceNumber int, handle *rc4P.Cipher, sealingKey, signingKey []byte, NegotiateFlags uint32) []byte {
// TODO: Need to keep track of the sequence number for connection oriented NTLM
if NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM.IsSet(NegotiateFlags) && NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY.IsSet(NegotiateFlags) {
handle, _ = reinitSealingKey(sealingKey, sequenceNumber)
} else if NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM.IsSet(NegotiateFlags) {
// CONOR: Reinitializing the rc4 cipher on every requst, but not using the
// algorithm as described in the MS-NTLM document. Just reinitialize it directly.
handle, _ = rc4Init(sealingKey)
}
sig := mac(NegotiateFlags, handle, signingKey, uint32(sequenceNumber), message)
return sig.Bytes()
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) Mac(message []byte, sequenceNumber int) ([]byte, error) {
mac := ntlmV1Mac(message, sequenceNumber, n.serverHandle, n.ServerSealingKey, n.ServerSigningKey, n.NegotiateFlags)
return mac, nil
}
func (n *V1ClientSession) Mac(message []byte, sequenceNumber int) ([]byte, error) {
mac := ntlmV1Mac(message, sequenceNumber, n.clientHandle, n.ClientSealingKey, n.ClientSigningKey, n.NegotiateFlags)
return mac, nil
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) VerifyMac(message, expectedMac []byte, sequenceNumber int) (bool, error) {
mac := ntlmV1Mac(message, sequenceNumber, n.clientHandle, n.ClientSealingKey, n.ClientSigningKey, n.NegotiateFlags)
return MacsEqual(mac, expectedMac), nil
}
func (n *V1ClientSession) VerifyMac(message, expectedMac []byte, sequenceNumber int) (bool, error) {
mac := ntlmV1Mac(message, sequenceNumber, n.serverHandle, n.ServerSealingKey, n.ServerSigningKey, n.NegotiateFlags)
return MacsEqual(mac, expectedMac), nil
}
/**************
Server Session
**************/
type V1ServerSession struct {
V1Session
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) ProcessNegotiateMessage(nm *NegotiateMessage) (err error) {
n.negotiateMessage = nm
return
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) GenerateChallengeMessage() (cm *ChallengeMessage, err error) {
// TODO: Generate this challenge message
return
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) SetServerChallenge(challenge []byte) {
n.serverChallenge = challenge
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) GetSessionData() *SessionData {
return &n.SessionData
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) ProcessAuthenticateMessage(am *AuthenticateMessage) (err error) {
n.authenticateMessage = am
n.NegotiateFlags = am.NegotiateFlags
n.clientChallenge = am.ClientChallenge()
n.encryptedRandomSessionKey = am.EncryptedRandomSessionKey.Payload
// Ignore the values used in SetUserInfo and use these instead from the authenticate message
// They should always be correct (I hope)
n.user = am.UserName.String()
n.userDomain = am.DomainName.String()
log.Printf("(ProcessAuthenticateMessage)NTLM v1 User %s Domain %s", n.user, n.userDomain)
err = n.fetchResponseKeys()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.computeExpectedResponses()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.computeSessionBaseKey()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.computeKeyExchangeKey()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !bytes.Equal(am.NtChallengeResponseFields.Payload, n.ntChallengeResponse) {
// There is a bug with the steps in MS-NLMP. In section 3.2.5.1.2 it says you should fall through
// to compare the lmChallengeResponse if the ntChallengeRepsonse fails, but with extended session security
// this would *always* pass because the lmChallengeResponse and expectedLmChallengeRepsonse will always
// be the same
if !bytes.Equal(am.LmChallengeResponse.Payload, n.lmChallengeResponse) || NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY.IsSet(n.NegotiateFlags) {
return errors.New("Could not authenticate")
}
}
n.mic = am.Mic
am.Mic = zeroBytes(16)
err = n.computeExportedSessionKey()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if am.Version == nil {
//UGH not entirely sure how this could possibly happen, going to put this in for now
//TODO investigate if this ever is really happening
am.Version = &VersionStruct{ProductMajorVersion: uint8(5), ProductMinorVersion: uint8(1), ProductBuild: uint16(2600), NTLMRevisionCurrent: uint8(15)}
log.Printf("Nil version in ntlmv1")
}
err = n.calculateKeys(am.Version.NTLMRevisionCurrent)
if err != nil {
return err
}
n.clientHandle, err = rc4Init(n.ClientSealingKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
n.serverHandle, err = rc4Init(n.ServerSealingKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (n *V1ServerSession) computeExportedSessionKey() (err error) {
if NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH.IsSet(n.NegotiateFlags) {
n.exportedSessionKey, err = rc4K(n.keyExchangeKey, n.encryptedRandomSessionKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// TODO: Calculate mic correctly. This calculation is not producing the right results now
// n.calculatedMic = HmacMd5(n.exportedSessionKey, concat(n.challengeMessage.Payload, n.authenticateMessage.Bytes))
} else {
n.exportedSessionKey = n.keyExchangeKey
// TODO: Calculate mic correctly. This calculation is not producing the right results now
// n.calculatedMic = HmacMd5(n.keyExchangeKey, concat(n.challengeMessage.Payload, n.authenticateMessage.Bytes))
}
return nil
}
/*************
Client Session
**************/
type V1ClientSession struct {
V1Session
}
func (n *V1ClientSession) GenerateNegotiateMessage() (nm *NegotiateMessage, err error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (n *V1ClientSession) ProcessChallengeMessage(cm *ChallengeMessage) (err error) {
n.challengeMessage = cm
n.serverChallenge = cm.ServerChallenge
n.clientChallenge = randomBytes(8)
// Set up the default flags for processing the response. These are the flags that we will return
// in the authenticate message
flags := uint32(0)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH.Set(flags)
// NOTE: Unsetting this flag in order to get the server to generate the signatures we can recognize
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_IDENTIFY.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET.Set(flags)
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE.Set(flags)
n.NegotiateFlags = flags
err = n.fetchResponseKeys()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.computeExpectedResponses()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.computeSessionBaseKey()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.computeKeyExchangeKey()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.computeEncryptedSessionKey()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = n.calculateKeys(cm.Version.NTLMRevisionCurrent)
if err != nil {
return err
}
n.clientHandle, err = rc4Init(n.ClientSealingKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
n.serverHandle, err = rc4Init(n.ServerSealingKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (n *V1ClientSession) GenerateAuthenticateMessage() (am *AuthenticateMessage, err error) {
am = new(AuthenticateMessage)
am.Signature = []byte("NTLMSSP\x00")
am.MessageType = uint32(3)
am.LmChallengeResponse, _ = CreateBytePayload(n.lmChallengeResponse)
am.NtChallengeResponseFields, _ = CreateBytePayload(n.ntChallengeResponse)
am.DomainName, _ = CreateStringPayload(n.userDomain)
am.UserName, _ = CreateStringPayload(n.user)
am.Workstation, _ = CreateStringPayload("SQUAREMILL")
am.EncryptedRandomSessionKey, _ = CreateBytePayload(n.encryptedRandomSessionKey)
am.NegotiateFlags = n.NegotiateFlags
am.Version = &VersionStruct{ProductMajorVersion: uint8(5), ProductMinorVersion: uint8(1), ProductBuild: uint16(2600), NTLMRevisionCurrent: uint8(15)}
return am, nil
}
func (n *V1ClientSession) computeEncryptedSessionKey() (err error) {
if NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH.IsSet(n.NegotiateFlags) {
n.exportedSessionKey = randomBytes(16)
n.encryptedRandomSessionKey, err = rc4K(n.keyExchangeKey, n.exportedSessionKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
n.encryptedRandomSessionKey = n.keyExchangeKey
}
return nil
}
/********************************
NTLM V1 Password hash functions
*********************************/
func ntowfv1(passwd string) []byte {
return md4(utf16FromString(passwd))
}
// ConcatenationOf( DES( UpperCase( Passwd)[0..6],"KGS!@#$%"), DES( UpperCase( Passwd)[7..13],"KGS!@#$%"))
func lmowfv1(passwd string) ([]byte, error) {
asciiPassword := []byte(strings.ToUpper(passwd))
keyBytes := zeroPaddedBytes(asciiPassword, 0, 14)
first, err := des(keyBytes[0:7], []byte("KGS!@#$%"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
second, err := des(keyBytes[7:14], []byte("KGS!@#$%"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return append(first, second...), nil
}